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The Effect of Central Grants on Local Tax and Non-tax Revenue 
Mobilisation in a Conflict Setting: Evidence from Côte d’Ivoire 
 
Tiangboho Sanogo and Jean-François Brun 
 
 
Summary 
 
This analysis uses panel data from thirty-five departments over the period 2001-2011 to 
analyse the effect of grants from central government on local revenue mobilisation in Côte 
d’Ivoire. The study considers the two components of local own revenue in Côte d’Ivoire: tax 
revenue (LTR) and non-tax revenue (LNTR). To perform the investigation, the analysis is 
based on a carefully-constructed novel dataset, and very recent and appropriate econometric 
estimators (Grouped Fixed Effects (GFE)). The GFE method assumes that unobserved 
heterogeneity can be constant and/or varying over time among individual departments. We 
combine this method with Instrumental Variable (IV) regressions in a two-stage least squares 
procedure to control for endogeneity of grants. Overall, the results show a statistically 
significant and positive effect of central grants on local mobilisation of tax and non-tax 
revenue. Thus, the study finds that central grants to municipalities do not displace local 
revenue, but instead lead to higher revenue. However, the effect on tax revenue is more 
important than that on non-tax revenue. A 10 per cent increase in total grants to local 
government is associated with a 4.1 per cent increase in tax revenue mobilised by local 
administration, while increasing non-tax revenue by only 1.8 per cent. We also find that, 
although conflict has a negative impact on mobilisation of local revenue, this impact remains 
generally limited. The conflict is not significant at 5 per cent statistical significance. 
 
Keywords: local government; intergovernmental transfers; municipalities; fiscal 
decentralisation; grouped fixed effect; conflict; Côte d’Ivoire. 
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Introduction 
 
In the last decades, a growing literature has stressed the potential (dis)incentive effects of 
central transfers on local revenue mobilisation in sub-Saharan Africa. Since the 1980s, many 
of these countries have been pursuing fiscal decentralisation as a main policy reform. Some 
of them, such as Uganda and South Africa, have significantly increased local own revenue 
by assigning tax-raising responsibilities to local authorities – consequently improving 
accountability and tax compliance. However, in most African countries central governments 
have been reluctant to release taxing responsibilities to sub-national governments (Bird 
2010). In these countries, there is a considerable imbalance between responsibility for 
expenditure and revenue collected, as the decentralisation of expenditure has often not been 
accompanied by equivalent revenue-raising responsibilities (Dahlberg et al. 2008). Transfers 
from central government therefore constitute the most important source of local revenue – 
these are often tied to specific projects, with limited decision-making responsibilities for local 
authorities (Rajaraman and Vasishtha 2000). The dependence of local government on grants 
has led to a number of problems that have been well analysed in the literature (Martinez-
Vasquez et al. 2013; Knight 2002; Mogues and Benin 2012; Caldeira and Rota-Graziosi 
2014). First, local government is likely to be discouraged from collecting their own revenue, 
subsequently reducing their financial autonomy and accountability to citizens. However, 
central transfers can also stimulate local revenue mobilisation when the distributional formula 
includes local tax effort as a condition of receiving the grants (Bahl 2000).1  
 
In many sub-Saharan African countries such as Côte d’Ivoire – where the process of fiscal 
decentralisation started in 1980 – transfers represent almost 80 per cent of total local 
revenue in some jurisdictions (DGDDL 2014). This high dependence on central transfers has 
been made worse by the political conflict that the country experienced from 2002 to 2010. 
The conflict may have eroded the local tax base, or central government might have diverted 
revenue away from grants for military spending. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to look beyond the impact of central grants on local government 
revenue mobilisation in Côte d’Ivoire, and explore the channels through which they operate 
in a conflict setting. For this purpose, we explore the hypothesis that the effect of grants 
differs for mobilisation of local tax or non-tax revenue. Giving that the country experienced a 
long period of political instability, we also examine whether this conflict context affects the 
capacity of local government to raise taxes, and consequently mitigates the link between 
local revenue mobilisation and central grants. The idea behind this hypothesis is that the 
conflict might affect the local tax base and non-tax base differently, as the former seems to 
be more stable than the latter.2  
 
This study makes two contributions to literature. First, we use a novel database on local 
government revenue combined with conflict indicators and the national Household Living 
Standard Survey (HLSS) in Côte d’Ivoire. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first 
to analyse the effect of grants on local mobilisation with such a disaggregated dataset in 
Côte d’Ivoire. Second, the paper uses an improved econometric method based on Grouped 
Fixed Effects (GFE), which estimates group membership from the data and controls for both 
time-varying and unvarying heterogeneity across departments. This differentiates our 
analysis from previous studies on intergovernmental transfers, which typically assume that 
unobserved heterogeneity is constant over time. 
                                                          
1  The terms ‘central transfers’ and ‘central grants’ are often used here to refer to grants allocated by central government 
to local government. 
2  In Côte d’Ivoire property taxes, essentially based on urban residential and commercial buildings and local businesses, 
represent the most important part of the local tax base. They appear to be more stable and less likely to be affected by 
conflict than local non-tax revenue, which is based on fees and charges – as shown in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. 
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The main conclusion is that central transfers increase local revenue mobilisation. The 
magnitude of this impact differs depending on the two components of local own revenue.3 
The grants effect is more important for tax revenue than non-tax revenue. Moreover, the 
results show that, though conflict has had a negative impact on local revenue mobilisation, 
this impact remains generally limited. The main results of this paper contradict those of 
Mogues and Benin (2012), who find that greater past external transfers to Ghana’s districts 
do not encourage internal revenue-raising. A possible explanation for the difference between 
Mogues and Benin (2012) and our results is that the effect differs depending on the specific 
country context, including the scope of local government revenue assignment, its discretion 
in setting rates on tax and fee bases, and other potential constraints affecting the ability of 
local government to increase its own revenue. Other potential reasons for the different 
results may be the allocation formulas used in Ghana, which do not contain a criteria 
sufficient to promote improvements in local government revenue mobilisation, as shown by 
Mogues and Benin (2012). The difference might also be explained by the method we use, 
which allows controlling for time-varying heterogeneity. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 provides an overview of the 
literature, highlighting channels through which transfers might affect local revenue 
mobilisation. In Section 2, we carry out a statistical analysis of Côte d’Ivoire’s transfer 
system, and present the potential correlation of transfers with local revenue mobilisation. 
Section 3 provides an analysis of the decentralisation process and local government’s 
revenue structure in Côte d’Ivoire. We interpret the main results and perform robustness 
checks on our findings in Section 4. Section 5 concludes and discusses the policy 
implications. 
 
 
1  Intergovernmental transfers and local 
revenue mobilisation in the literature 
 
Relying on the theoretical and empirical literature, this section discusses channels through 
which transfers might affect local tax mobilisation.  
 
First, literature has shown that local revenue mobilisation is boosted when local governments 
control large tax bases – this allows them to get responsibility over the use of this revenue 
and to spend it according to local preferences. Providing that local authorities’ accountability 
increases with tax-raising responsibilities, the preferences of the people are better accounted 
for (Oates 1993). When taxpayers receive the services they expect it is assumed they will 
accept paying taxes, resulting in less resistance to cost-recovery of user charges (Bahl 
1999). In this regard, transfers might be perceived as a kind of windfall resource, crowding 
out local own revenue and reducing subsequent accountability and the incentive for local 
government to collect revenue internally (Caldeira and Rota-Graziosi 2014). Many studies 
have also found that transfers can be a source of inefficiency, affecting local tax 
performance. Bahl and Linn (1992) and Moore (2008), studying local fiscal federalism in 
developing countries, argue that grants can make local government less accountable for their 
fiscal decisions and reduce tax effort, as transfer dependency is widespread in most of these 
countries. 
 
                                                          
3  According to legislation, local own revenue has two principle components: revenue collected by local tax 
administrations, and tax revenue collected on behalf of local government by the General Tax Directorate and shared 
according to a predefined formula. 
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Second, intergovernmental transfers may impact local revenue performance due to 
corruption. Prud’homme (1995: 211) suggests that ‘local politicians and bureaucrats are 
likely to be more subject to pressing demands from local interest groups’. Therefore, local 
authorities can divert grants away from their intended objectives, such as delivery of 
services, for personal gain. This is more prevalent in developing countries, where local 
elections are often based on tribal and/or political affiliation. Moreover, in low-income 
countries local authorities are more likely to spend external grants ineffectively than the 
resources they have raised (Bird and Smart 2002).  
 
Furthermore, intergovernmental transfers might have a positive impact on equality among 
and within local government, which will consequently affect tax compliance and revenue 
mobilisation. Indeed, central government often uses grants, such as equalisation grants, to 
address regional disparities. This results in improved local wellbeing, and therefore increases 
the tax base for local government. On the other hand, some authors have also shown that 
transfers aimed at reducing inequality might have a negative effect due to the complexity of 
some equalisation programmes. Buettner (2006), for example, finds that the volume of grants 
received by municipalities is likely to be inversely related to the local tax rate, leading to more 
inequality, due to variations in the tax base. He develops a theoretical model accounting for 
an incentive effect of fiscal decentralisation on tax effort using data on German 
municipalities. Moreover, Liu and Zhao (2011) show that inequalities can decrease tax 
compliance.4 They explain that in a context of high inequality citizens will avoid tax, resulting 
in substantial loss of revenue. As most developing countries are characterised by large 
regional disparities, an equalisation system can lead to important loss of revenue 
mobilisation at the local level. This was the main point made by Canavire-Bacarreza et al. 
(2012), when analysing the main factors explaining the poor revenue collection performance 
of sub-national governments in Peru. They find that, when distributed without consideration 
of the relative expenditure needs of local government, transfer of revenue from extractive 
industries creates a disincentive effect on tax effort. 
 
Intergovernmental transfers can affect tax performance through their impact on economic 
growth. As Martinez-Vasquez and Rider (2006) show, high transfer dependency induces a 
lack of fiscal discipline among local government. This threatens the ability of a country to 
sustain high rates of economic growth. In addition, using transfers to soften local budget 
constraints, as is common in developing countries, represents a threat to macroeconomic 
stability. Indeed, by expecting support from central government in case of financial trouble, 
local government might have an incentive to increase their deficit. Rodden (2006) and Martell 
and Smith (2004), focusing on Germany and the United States respectively, find that local 
governments that expect a bailout tend to borrow more than those that do not. Other authors 
support this idea, and claim that local governments that face soft budget constraints are 
potentially inefficient in spending. This is likely to create macroeconomic instability, which will 
reduce tax effort (Ter-Minassian 1997; Weingast 2009; Bird 2010; World Bank 2001). This 
may therefore potentially hinder economic growth and consequently reduce tax effort. This 
argument is consistent with the results of de Mello (2000), who finds that reliance on 
intergovernmental transfers worsens fiscal positions at the central level for non-OECD 
countries.  
 
Although intergovernmental transfers may constitute a threat to macroeconomic stability they 
can reduce the volatility of local tax revenue, which partly depends on economic growth. 
Bordignon (2000) argues that the soft budget constraints of Italian local government generate 
efficiency losses by inducing a lack of political accountability, and undermines the soundness 
of public finances. However, the improved efficiency in service delivery predicted by the fiscal 
federalism literature is also based on intergovernmental competition (Tiebout 1956). This 
                                                          
4  They also show that inequalities can erode the quality of institutions. 
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competition requires a hard budget constraint among jurisdictions that must bear the full 
financial consequences of their policy decisions (Weingast 2009). In this way, the 
dependence of local government on transfers may mitigate the expected results from fiscal 
decentralisation, and thus reduce revenue mobilisation. 
 
It is believed that the assignment criteria for transfers plays a key role in the relationship 
between local revenue mobilisation and central transfers. According to Bird and Vaillancourt 
(2006), these criteria must be designed in a way that does not discourage local authorities 
from collecting their own source revenue. Unfortunately, in low-income countries the 
allocation is often motivated by political rather than economic and social considerations, as 
shown by Chambas (2010) and Caldeira and Rota-Graziosi (2014) in the case of Benin. 
Transfers are also excessively delayed and volatile, as argued by Fjeldstad and Heggstad 
(2012) when examining constraints and opportunities in English-speaking African countries. 
This, in turn, negatively affects the local administration’s ability to implement the strategy for 
local development. There is also evidence that intergovernmental transfers are diverted away 
from service delivery due to political targeting (Banful 2011). 
 
As highlighted above, the effect of central transfers on tax performance highlighted above 
varies widely across countries, depending on their tax structure. The effects are particularly 
important in sub-Saharan African countries, as local government is highly dependent on 
central transfers. However, this relationship has received little attention in literature, even 
though fiscal decentralisation has been implemented since the 1990s.  
 
 
2  Empirical framework: fiscal decentralisation 
in Côte d’Ivoire 
 
2.1 Overview of Côte d’Ivoire  
 
Côte d’Ivoire is a sub-Saharan African country; more than half its population of 22 million live 
in urban areas (World Bank 2012). The country is recovering from eleven years of economic 
stagnation and political conflict, which culminated in a post-election crisis in 2010-2011. 
Since 1980, Côte d’Ivoire has attempted to implement decentralisation by transferring 
responsibility for expenditure and revenue-raising to sub-national governments, with the aim 
of improving effectiveness and efficiency in the delivery of public services.  
 
The revenue structure of local government in Côte d’Ivoire is largely inherited from the 
French colonial period. Law No. 55-1489 of 18 November 1955 established various 
operational municipalities in Abidjan, Bouaké and Grand Bassam, which did not have 
financial autonomy. After independence in 1960, decentralisation, and especially the financial 
autonomy of local government, were clearly not a priority for the central government. 
Although municipal council members and mayors were elected, the central government only 
started the process of decentralisation under Law No. 80-1162 of 17 October 1980. This law 
defined a specific status and electoral regime for municipalities, and created thirty-seven 
municipality councils in addition to Abidjan. In 2000 the government adopted a new 
constitution, which sets out the principle for administration and financial autonomy of local 
authorities. This constitution subdivides the country into a multi-tiered system with 19 regions 
at the top level: these are divided into 58 departments led by department councils, 197 
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municipalities at the lowest level, and 2 districts (Abidjan and Yamoussoukro).5 The Ministry 
of Interior is responsible for management and development of decentralisation, through the 
Directorate in Charge of Decentralisation and Local Development (DGDDL). DGDDL 
collaborates with the Ministry of Economy and Finance through the Public Treasury 
Directorate to define the amount of intergovernmental transfers and their allocation. These 
administrations interact with local governments, which are organised under the Côte d’Ivoire 
Union for Cities and Municipalities (UVICOCI). The relationship between central and local 
government is managed through a trusteeship system with two levels that approve their 
decisions and provide advice and assistance.  
 
In the process of reinforcing the fiscal autonomy of local government, more than thirty-five 
legislative decrees and laws have been passed to assign expenditure functions and revenue 
sources across lower levels of government. These responsibilities often relate to the 
provision of important and diverse public services, such as health and education facilities, 
water and sanitation, local urbanisation, and building. The responsibilities also include some 
sources of tax revenue, which, though limited, can contribute significantly to local total 
revenue.  
 
2.2 Local revenue structure in Côte d’Ivoire 
 
In Côte d’Ivoire, as in many developing countries, total local revenue represents a small 
fraction of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Figure 1 shows the average local government 
revenue structure, including: central grants; local revenue collected by the central 
government through the General Tax Directorate (GTD), which we call Local Tax Revenue 
(LTR);6 Local Non-Tax Revenue (LNTR), specifically collected by local administration; and 
other revenue.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
5  Since 2011, although the number of municipalities has remained almost unchanged, the Ivorian government has 
reorganised the country into 14 districts (with full autonomy for Abidjan and Yamoussokro), 31 regions, 95 departments, 
and 198 municipalities, each with an elected mayor. 
6  According to legislation, local own revenue has two principle components: revenue collected by the local tax 
administration, and tax revenue collected on behalf of local government by the General Tax Directorate (GTD) and 
shared according to a predefined formula. 
Figure 1 Local government revenue structure in Côte d’Ivoire 
Local Own Revenue 
Local Non-Tax Revenue 
(Collected by local revenue 
administration) 
Local Tax Revenue 
(Collected by GTD on 
behalf of local government) 
Central Grants 
Basic 
programme 
Additional 
programme 
Total Local Revenue  
Other Revenue 
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Figure 2 shows the percentage of GDP contributed by different types of local revenue. Total 
local revenue represents only 0.64 per cent and 0.53 per cent of GDP for 2004 and 2005 
respectively. LTR represents the larger share of this total revenue, with on average 0.26 per 
cent of GDP over the two years. At the same time, central grants account for 0.20 per cent of 
GDP. Revenue collected by local administration (LNTR) was only 0.13 per cent of GDP. 
According to the Ivorian Constitution many sources of revenue are classified as other 
revenue: this includes miscellaneous revenue, external aid, loans, and ordinary reserve 
funds ‘Fonds des Reserves Ordinaires’. Other revenue accounted for about 0.1 per cent of 
GDP in 2005.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Local government revenue structure as percentage of GDP, Côte d'Ivoire 
2004 and 2005 (all levels of sub-government) 
 
When analysing by sub-government categories over the last decade, we find that these 
figures hide considerable disparities in revenue source. Figure 3 reflects the relative 
composition of total municipality revenue over the period 2001-2011. Over this period, grants 
from the central government contributed on average more than 50 per cent of total 
municipality revenue, and slightly decreased in the three-year period leading up to the 2010 
national election.7 During the same period municipalities have collected a small part of their 
total revenue, accounting for on average less than 25 per cent of total revenue. However, tax 
revenue represents on average 20 per cent of municipality total revenue and remains 
relatively constant in absolute terms up to 2011. This revenue is part of local own revenue 
and depends on the local tax potential. Combining this two components, local own revenue 
reaches 45 per cent of total revenue. This contribution is relatively low compared to 
developing countries like Benin, where municipalities’ own revenue contributed 69 per cent of 
total revenue over the period 2003 to 2008. 
 
 
                                                          
7  This trend suggests a possible reassignment of resources to election expenditure, since the allocation criteria of these 
grants remain mostly under the discretion of central government. 
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Figure 3 Composition of municipality revenue structure as percentage of total 
revenue, Côte d'Ivoire 2001-2011 
 
Moreover, this average hides significant variations and disparities between large urban 
municipalities and small rural ones. In fact, Côte d’Ivoire is characterised by wide tax 
disparities among regions, as Bahl (2000) noted for developing and transition countries. 
Table 1 shows the structure of total municipality revenue for different categories of 
municipalities in 2012. While municipalities in Abidjan and large urban municipalities (e.g. 
Daloa and Korhogo) internally mobilise more than 45 per cent of their total revenue, smaller 
municipalities (e.g. Bédiala and Kaniasso) are almost fully dependent on grants from central 
government as they collect less than 10 per cent of total revenue. Some northern 
municipalities (e.g. Kanakono and Kouto) collect almost no revenue, as LNTR accounts for 
less than 1 per cent of total revenue (DGDDL 2014). These disparities justify the use of 
grants to reduce inter-regional inequalities in revenue potential. In order to make this 
equalisation policy more effective and pro-poor, as well as to improve local revenue 
mobilisation, a number of issues must be considered: the revenue source supporting these 
transfers, the distribution formula used to allocate resources, and expenditure responsibilities 
of local government. 
 
Table 1 Revenue structure across different categories of local government, Côte 
d'Ivoire, 2012 
Category Municipality 
Tax revenue 
Non-tax 
revenue 
Central grants Other 
Total 
revenue 
Value* % value % value % value % value 
Abidjan 
Adjame 923.85 (44.12) 973.03 (46.47) 197.21 (9.42)   2094.09 
Abobo 581.26 (25.80) 911.59 (40.46) 179.09 (7.95)   2252.83 
Large 
Daloa 241.59 (25.13) 441.53 (45.92) 278.40 (28.95)   961.52 
Kohorgo 168.40 (34.19) 200.28 (40.67) 51.15 (10.39) 72.67 (14.75) 492.49 
Middle 
Tanda 37.83 (21.45) 26.58 (15.07) 98.70 (55.97) 13.23 (7.50) 176.35 
Biankouma 8.72 (6.89) 24.46 (19.32) 47.74 (37.71) 45.68 (36.08) 126.60 
Small 
Bédiala 0.38 (0.40) 11.18 (11.61) 82.33 (85.52) 2.38 (2.48) 96.27 
Kaniasso 0.30 (0.47) 1.79 (2.86) 60.06 (95.87) 0.50 (0.80) 62.65 
*Base data - millions of Franc CFA, unless otherwise specified; percentage of total local revenue in parentheses 
 
Source: Calculation by authors with Côte d’Ivoire data collected by the Ministry of Interior (DGDDL). 
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2.3 Central grants and local own revenue in Côte d’Ivoire 
 
Central transfers are the most important source of financing for almost all municipalities in 
Côte d’Ivoire. There are two sources of central grants: a basic and an additional allocation 
programme.  
 
The Ivorian government organises a first type of transfers, named ‘Aide de l’Etat’ (basic 
programme). The total endowment of this fund is determined annually by the Directorate 
General for Budget in collaboration with local government, and approved by a majority vote 
in the Ivorian Parliament. This structure is determined by a mix of grants for capital 
expenditure, ‘dotation générale pour investissement’; and grants for recurrent expenditure, 
‘dotation générale de fonctionnement’. The basic allocation aims to help municipalities to 
provide a minimum level of public services to their constituencies. The distributional formula 
is based on many indicators, such as the size of municipalities, the presence of central 
government institutions, and the size of the population. The amounts vary from FCFA250 per 
capita for the most populated municipalities, to FCFA1000 per capita for less populated 
localities. These amounts were established in 2001, and may be modified from year to year 
depending on central government budgeting. The allocation criteria for grants for capital 
expenditure rely to an extent on the discretion of the central government and economic policy 
goals. 
 
The second type of grants, ‘aide exceptionelle’ (additional allocation), serves to cover 
exceptional costs that certain authorities come up against. According to the Ivorian 
constitution, this grant is only allocated to the municipalities of Yamoussoukro, Bouaké, 
Korhogo and Abidjan.  
 
When analysing the allocation of basic grants over the three post-conflict years, figures show 
that transfers made for operational expenditure tend to be higher than those made for capital 
expenditure in all municipalities. In the western and northern regions, which were more 
affected by conflict, grants for capital expenditure are almost equal to grants for operational 
expenditure (Figure 4).  
 
 
 
Figure 4 Composition of basic grants, post-conflict Côte d'Ivoire, 2010-2012 
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These figures may reflect the central government’s vision of ensuring greater access to basic 
services after the conflict, and reducing regional disparities. As the northern region 
experienced a higher incidence of violence due to the conflict, the share of capital grants to 
northern municipalities is higher than that to municipalities that were under the control of the 
regular army. Note that literature has pointed out that transfer systems organised to reduce 
disparities amongst regions (horizontal imbalance), by transferring more revenue to poorer 
regions, can produce disincentives. Some municipalities can free-ride on the tax effort of 
other municipalities and under-exploit their tax potential, as showed by Weingast (2014). 
Having highlighted the different components of the grants received by municipalities, now we 
turn to the composition of their local own revenue. 
 
Local own revenue in Côte d’Ivoire is composed of Local Tax Revenue (LTR), collected on 
behalf of local government by the central tax administration and shared according to 
predefined formulas, and Local Non-Tax Revenue (LNTR), which is collected by 
municipalities.8 
 
The principal sources of LNTR are: licences, residential tax and various charges (for 
business, market, construction permits, bars, shows, advertising, hotels, etc.); service fees 
(water, sanitation, waste collection, etc.); and vehicle tax (often shared with the centre). From 
2002 to 2007, on average the tax on small local businesses and licences contributed the 
most important share of local own revenue, with more than 26 per cent, while lease fees 
accounted for less than 6 per cent. On average, from 2002 to 2007 market fees and flat tax 
together represented almost 50 per cent of municipality own revenue (DGDDL 2014). It is 
worth noting that the revenue collected internally is under the control of local government.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Composition of local non-tax revenue, Côte d'Ivoire, 2002-2007 
 
The Directorate General for Tax, in collaboration with municipalities, collects LTR on behalf 
of local governments, and transfers this revenue to them. This process aims to make local 
tax mobilisation more efficient, since the capacity of municipalities is often limited. Consistent 
with the literature,9 some local taxes in Côte d’Ivoire are well managed by the central 
government. Table 2 breaks down these taxes and the distributional rules across different 
                                                          
8  It is worth noting that local non-tax revenue, although called non-tax, contains small local revenue sources that can be 
classified as taxes. 
9  Bird (2000) notes that a large number of taxes are well managed by the central government. 
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level of government. LTR includes property tax,10 which is based on local residence tax, real 
property tax, land tax (non-built areas), and lastly tax on the public road network, hygiene 
and sanitation. These taxes are distributed across six levels of government (municipalities, 
cities,11 departments, regions, districts and the central government). The other sources of tax 
revenue are motor vehicle tax (vignette), synthetic tax, patent and licence and tax on 
gambling (casino). Forty percent of these taxes are allocated to municipalities; central 
government receives 10 per cent, except for local residence tax, of which 60 per cent of 
revenue is kept by central government. Only revenue from vignette is equally distributed 
between municipalities and central government, with 20 per cent for each. The other 60 per 
cent is shared across other levels of local government (Table 2). As municipalities are the 
only level of local government with tax-raising responsibilities, this redistribution can prevent 
municipalities from developing their revenue-raising capacity.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 summarises the distribution of tax revenue across sub-governments in 2012. The 
share of municipalities is slightly less than the 40 per cent noted in the constitution. On 
average, this share reaches FCFA36.87 billion – 35.4 per cent. Only the revenue from 
vignette complies with the law, with 20 per cent allocated to municipalities (FCFA2.13 billion). 
The central government withheld 29 per cent LTR in 2012. In Côte d’Ivoire, business licences 
are intended to be a significant revenue source for local government. The share of the 
central government represents more than 25.2 per cent, clearly above the percentage fixed 
by the law (10 per cent). While 39.9 per cent is allocated to municipalities, 18.5 per cent to 
districts and 7 per cent to departments, central government retains more revenue than what 
is planned by the formula. A review of this formula and the devolution of some tax-raising 
responsibilities to local government could reinforce the link between local authorities and 
citizens. 
  
                                                          
10  Unfortunately in Côte d’Ivoire the availability of relevant property registers and data is limited. As in many African 
countries, Côte d’Ivoire does not include agricultural land in the property tax base. 
11  Only the cities of Abidjan and Yamoussokro. 
Type of revenue 
Distributional formula 
Municipality City District Department Region 
Central 
government 
Other 
taxes 
Patent and licences 40% 5% 5% 25% 15% 10% 
Synthetic tax 40% no no 25% 10 15% 
Tax on casinos no no 100% no no no 
Vignette Motor vehicle tax 20% 5% 10% 30% 15% 20% 
Property 
tax 
Tax on public road 
network, hygiene and 
sanitation 
40% 5% 5% 25% 15% 10% 
Real property tax 40% 5% 5% 25% 15% 10% 
Land tax (non-built or 
vacant lands) 
40% 5% 5% 25% 15% 10% 
Local residence tax 40% no no no no 60% 
Source GTD-Côte d'Ivoire 
 
Table 2 Distributional rule of revenue collected by GTD in Côte d'Ivoire 
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3  Empirical analysis 
 
3.1 Data  
 
The analysis draws mainly on three sources of data. The first one is a local government 
revenue and expenditure dataset (Sanogo 2015). This dataset has been constructed from 
two major sources: the Administrative Account of municipalities collected by the DGDDL, and 
the National Account relating to local government from the Ministry of Economy and Finance. 
This dataset provides information on local government revenue for 115 municipalities over 
the period 2001-2011. It contains Local Government Own Revenue (LGOR), transfers from 
the central government, and other revenue. Our variable of interest is central grants. In 
addition, we use data on expenditure available for 117 municipalities over the same period, 
aggregated into 35 departments. We then compute the rate of execution of local expenditure. 
These rates are used by central government to allocate grants to local governments in Côte 
d’Ivoire.12 For socioeconomic and demographic factors that are additional determinants of 
LGOR performance, we use the dataset collected by the National Statistical Institute (INS), 
which is based on the national Household Living Standard Survey (HLSS) for the years 2002 
and 2008.13 The HLSS is a national demographic and economic survey providing information 
on living conditions, infrastructure, poverty, education, employment and other covariates. The 
HLSS design ensures representativeness of Côte d’Ivoire’s 196 municipalities. 
Approximately 70 households were surveyed in each locality, with a total of 10,800 and 
13,657 households respectively in 2002 and 2008. Based on this dataset, and following 
Mogues and Benin (2012), we construct measures of potential explanatory variables that 
allow to control for tax base and the capacity of local governments to collect their own taxes. 
                                                          
12  This rate is calculated for each expenditure type through the following formula, where t represents the year:  
 
*100
  
t
t
t
Expenditures executed
Rate
Forcasts of Expenditure

 
13  The surveys provide information on whether the household has access to several facilities like running water, electricity, 
health and education infrastructure. They also contain information about households own durable assets such as fridge, 
computer, car, etc. 
Government 
level * 
 
PATENT 
Synthetic 
tax 
Game 
tax 
Vignette 
Stamp 
duties 
Property  
Tax 
Sub-
Total2 
Total 
Purchasers Traders 
Public 
Transport 
Sub-
Total1 
Patent 
Central 
Government 
75.99 8912.47 769.92 9758.39 2715.50 0 1756.24 4290.5 11727.89 20490.15 30248.54 
(32.66) (25.12) (26.08) (25.24) (52.49) (0.00) (16.49) (97.7) (26.01) (31.3) (29.05) 
District 
0.8 10182.92 546.45 10730.18 441.53 161.28 3394.18 0 10269.54 14266.55 24996.73 
(0.34) (28.70) (18.51) (27.75) (8.53) (100.00) (31.89) (0.00) (22.78) (21.80) (24.01) 
Department 
67.37 2194.01 474.48 2735.88 101.68 0 976.57 0 1536.05 2614.3 5350.18 
(28.95) (6.18) (16.07) (7.07) (1.96) (0.00) (9.17) (0.00) (3.41) (3.99) (5.14) 
Municipality 
88.46 14181.63 1160.63 15430.73 1914.19 0 2138.67 0 17387.6 21440.47 36871.21 
(38.02) (39.98) (39.32) (39.91) (37.00) (0.00) (20.09) (0.00) (38.57) (32.76) (35.42) 
Other 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2378.31 100.74 4164.51 6643.57 6643.57 
0 (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (22.34) (2.29) (9.24) (10.15) (6.38) 
TOTAL 232.64 35471.04 2951.50 38655.19 5172.92 161.28 10643.99 4391.24 45085.59 65455.04 104110.24 
* Base data - millions of Franc CFA, unless otherwise specified ; percentage of different revenue allocated to each level of 
government in parentheses 
 
Source: Calculation by authors with Côte d’Ivoire data from Directorate General of Taxation. 
 
Table 3 Local tax revenue collected by GTD and distributed across governments, post-
conflict Côte d'Ivoire, 2012 
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We additionally use information relative to geographical distribution of the population from 
INS to calculate the density of population and the share of urban population over the period 
under study.  
 
Third, conflict indicators are computed using data from the Armed Conflict Location and 
Event Dataset (ACLED) (Raleigh et al. 2010). ACLED contains information on the exact 
dates and location of political violence, the conflict events, and a fatality index measuring the 
intensity of each event.14 The conflict events selected in this data include three types of 
battles (violence against civilians, remote violence and rioting), protests (non-violent 
demonstrations) and other non-violent events. We multiply these conflict events with the 
fatality index of each event by locality to control for conflict effects.15  
  
Finally, we combine these three data sources and aggregate at departmental level to 
construct a panel spanning eleven years (2001-2011) for thirty-five departments.  
 
3.2 Summary statistics 
 
As shown in Appendix Table A2, the mean of total grants per capita taken over the sample is 
approximately FCFA1551 with a standard deviation of about 3491 across the country. This 
amount varies more in the southern departments (4099.59) compared to the northern 
departments (1067.34), with a higher incidence of conflict as indicated by standard deviation. 
Appendix Table A2 also shows statistically significant differences between the conflict-
affected northern region and the south in households’ living conditions and tax base. For 
example, the mean poverty headcount rate in the northern area reaches 42 per cent, which 
is higher than the mean for all the sample (38 per cent) and that of southern departments (36 
per cent). Inequality is also higher in these most-affected departments, as shown by standard 
deviation of poverty headcount rate. See Appendix Table A2 for a more detailed description 
of departments’ characteristics and summary statistics. 
 
3.3 Descriptive statistics  
 
In this sub-section, we investigate the correlation between local revenue mobilisation and 
central grants. To measure revenue mobilisation, we use per capita own revenue (tax and 
non-tax). Figures 6 and 7 show the relationship between central grants, and local tax 
revenue and non-tax revenue respectively. The correlations are presented for the two 
components in order to compare the revenue collected by the local administration with that 
collected by the General Tax Directorate. As suggested in Figure 6, an increase in grants 
seems to positively affect the local revenue collected by local tax administration (LNTR) 
(correlation = 0.103). However, the trend of this relationship differs slightly when assessing 
for LTR, as indicated by the prediction line in Figure 7 (correlation = -0.059). LNTR varies 
more significantly across the country than LTR. Nevertheless, all these graphs suggest a 
significant relationship between the grants received by departments and their performance in 
raising their own revenue, although this correlation seems weak. This difference between 
LNTR and LTR in terms of correlation also reveals the importance of disaggregating local 
own revenue when assessing the relationship between grants and local revenue 
performance, which will be examined in detail in the following section.  
 
 
 
   
                                                          
14  The fatality index reports the number of deaths due to each event, lower numbers represent least violence. The fatality 
index varies from 1 to 10 with 10 for the highest incidence of violence. 
15  As our interest period is characterised by political instability and sporadic conflict events, it is reasonable to think that 
this context may have negatively affected the capacity of local government to raise taxes. 
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Source: Calculation by authors with Côte d’Ivoire data collected by DGDDL.  
 
Figure 6 Local non-tax revenue vs. central grants (2001-2011) 
 
Source: Calculation by authors with Côte d’Ivoire data collected by DGDDL.  
 
Figure 7 Local tax revenue vs. central grants (2001-2011) 
3.4 Econometric specification 
 
Unlike existing literature on fiscal decentralisation, we take advantage of up-to-date 
developments in the econometric literature, and use the Grouped Fixed Effect (GFE) method 
recently developed by Bonhomme and Manresa (2015) for this analysis.  
 
We mainly adopt Mogues and Benin’ (2012) model specification where local revenue is 
measured by per capita internal local revenue and depends on the level of central grants. 
However, contrary to their approach, we assume that  local governments’ unobserved 
heterogeneity is not constant over the period under study, and specify a different approach to 
consider for specific characteristics that vary over time following the baseline GFE model 
below: 
 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆 +  𝜃𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁         𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇         (1) 
 
ABGABG
ABGABABGABG
ABG
ABSABS
ABS
ABSABSABSABS
ADKADKADKADKADKADK
ADK
AZP AZPAZPAZPAZPAZPAZPAZPAZPAZP
ZP
AGV AGVAGV AGVAGV AGVAGV
AGV
GAGB
AGBAGBAGBAGBAGB
L ALPALP
ALPALPALP
ALPL
BGLBGL
BGL
BGL
BON
BON
BON
BON
BON
BON
BON
BONBONBON
BOG
BOG
BOG
BOGBOGBOGBOGBOG
BOG
BKE
BKEBKE
BNA
BNA
BNA
BNA
DAB
DAB
DAB
DLLDLADLADLADLADLA
DLA
DLA
DKRDKRKRDKRDKR
DKR
DKRDKR
GUIIGUIGUI
GUI
KATKAT KATK O
KGO
KGO
KGOKGO
LKT
LKT
LKT
LKT
LKTLKT
LKTLKTLKT
LKTLKT
MBA
MBAMBAMBAMBAM
MBAMB
MBA
ODN
ODN
ODN
ODN
ODN
ODN
OUMOUMOUMOUM
OUMOUM OUMOUMOUM
SPDSPDSPDSPD
SSD
SSDSSDDSSD
SSD
S D
SD
SEG
SEG
SEG
SEG
SEG
SEG
SBE
SBESBESBE SBE SBESBE
SBESBE
SBE
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TABTAB
TANTANTANT NTANT N
TISTIS
TIISTIS TITISITIS
TIS
TI
TBS
T S
T S TBS
TBSTBST ST S
TBS
TBS
TBS
TBU
TBU
TBU
TBUTBU
TMDTMD TMD
TMD
TMD
TMDTMD
TMD
TMD
TMD
0
2
4
6
8
10
Lo
ca
l N
on
-T
ax
 R
ev
en
ue
 p
er
 c
ap
ita
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Central grants
Performance linear prediction
lo hi
Fitted values
Data source:  DGDDL Côte d'Ivoire, 2014
correlation 0.103
ABGABG
ABGABGABABG
ABG
ABG
ABG
ABS
ABS
ABS
ABS
ABS
ABSABSABS
ABS
ADK
ADKDK
ADK
ADK
ADK
ADK
ADK
ADK
AZP
AZP
AZP
AZP
AZP
AZPAZPAZP
ZP
ZP
AZP
AGVVGV
AGV
A V
AGV
AGV
AGV
AGV
AGV
AGV
AG GB
GBGBA BGAGBA B
AGB ALP
ALPALP ALPALP
ALPALP
ALP
BGL
BGL
BGL
BGL
BON
BON
BON
BON
BON
BONBON
BON
BON
BOG
BOG
BOGB
BOGBOG
BOG
BOGBOG
BKE
BKE
BNA
BNA
DLADLADLA
DLA
DL
DLA
DLA
DLA
DLA
DL
DKRDKR
DKR
DKR
DKR
DKR
DKRK
DKR
DKR
GUI
GUI
GUI
GUI
KGO
KGO
KGOKGO
LKT
LKT LKT
LKT
LKT
LKT
LKT
LKT
LKTLKTMBAMBA
MBA
MBA
MBA
MBA
MBA
MBA
MBA
MBA
ODNODN
ODN
ODN
ODN
ODN
ODN
OUM
OUM
OUM
OUMOUM
OUM
OUM
OUM OUMOUM
OUM
SPD
SPD
SPD SSD
SSD
SS
SSDSSDSSD
SSD
SSS
SEG
SEG
SEG
SEG
SEG
SBE
SBE
SBE
SBE
SBE
SBE
SBE
SBE
SBE SBE
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TABTAB
TAN
TATA
T N
T NT N
TAN
TAN
T N
TIS
TIS
TI
TISTIS
TI
TISTITIS
IS
TIS
TBS
T S
TBS
TBS
TBS
TBS
TBS
TBS
TBS
TBS
TBS
TBU
TBU
TBU
TBU
TLP
TLP
TLP
TLP
TLP
TLP
TLP
TMD
TM
TMD
TMD
TMDT DM
TMD
TMD
TMD
TMD
0
2
4
6
8
10
Lo
ca
l T
ax
 R
ev
en
ue
 p
er
 c
ap
ita
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Central grants
Sharing linear prediction
lo hi
Fitted values
Data source:  DGDDL Côte d'Ivoire, 2014
correlation -0.059
 19 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 represents the dependent variable, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a set of explanatory variables. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 represents an 
idiosyncratic disturbance. An important contribution of this model is the inclusion of the 
group-specific unobservable effects  𝛼𝑔𝑖𝑡 where 𝑔𝑖  𝜖{1, … , 𝐺} is a group membership which 
maps individual units into groups that are estimated endogenously with the parameters of our 
specification. For this approach, both the group-specific time patterns and individual group 
membership are left unrestricted and estimated from the data. 
 
We modify model (1) to incorporate time-invariant fixed effects, the two components of local 
own revenue, and time-variant grouped effects using the following specification: 
 
ln(𝐿𝐺𝑂𝑅)𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆 +  θ 1ln(𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑥𝑖𝑡  + 𝛼𝑔𝑖𝑡 +  𝜂𝑖  +  𝜀𝑖𝑡             (2)  
 
The dependent variable ln(𝐿𝐺𝑂𝑅)𝑖𝑡 is the log of per capita local own revenue (LGOR). It 
represents internal funds generated by each department 𝑖 at time 𝑡 (LNTR or LTR). Our 
variable of interest ln(𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠)𝑖𝑡 is a log of grants per capita to department 𝑖 at time 𝑡 (basic 
and addition allocation). We follow the existing literature to identify control variables that 
proxy for local revenue performance represented by 𝑥𝑖𝑡 (economic, demographic and social 
characteristics). The group-specific unobservable effects 𝛼𝑔𝑖𝑡  will be modified to account for 
the department-specific fixed effect 𝜂𝑖   as presented above. In sum, specific socioeconomic 
variables and other explanatory variables included in the estimating regression are additional 
potential determinants of locally-generated revenue, especially factors that determine the tax 
revenue base and the capacity of local government to collect taxes. 
 
The endogeneity problem is one of the most important concerns when analysing the effect of 
central grants on revenue performance of local government. Local own revenue can 
inversely determine grants when central government rewards local governments that commit 
their own revenue to some public spending, as outlined by Caldeira and Rota-Graziosi 
(2014) and Knight (2002). As this relationship is the opposite of our analysis, the reverse 
causality induces a bias in estimations. A second potential source of endogeneity is that 
there are unobserved features of departments which are indirectly correlated with the 
internally-generated revenue through the grants that local government is able to attract. For 
example, the internal effectiveness of local government in terms of tax collection and local 
technical staff training are unobservable in our model. It is therefore hard to consider the 
allocation of grants as an exogenous factor affecting local government revenue mobilisation.  
 
In order to account for this possibility, we follow Knight (2002) in using the political affiliation 
of local government as an instrumental variable of central grants. We use a dummy variable 
that takes 1 if the local government has the same political affiliation as central government, 
and 0 otherwise. Being a member of the majority party is very determinant in a local 
government receiving a greater share of grants.16 We also take advantage of our data, which 
allows computing the execution rate of expenditure in each locality. This rate is estimated 
from budgets of capital and current expenditure, by finding the difference between budgets 
and actual expenditure at the end of each fiscal year. The rate of consumption of the budget 
is a good instrumental variable for grants since the jurisdictions that spend more of the 
amount budgeted receive larger grants the following year. This means that the execution rate 
is likely to be correlated with grants allocated. Moreover, the execution rate is less likely to be 
correlated with revenue collected by local government, as it is an exogenous formula used by 
central government when setting the overall amount of grants to be transferred. The 
estimations results will help confirming these two requirements for instrumental variables to 
be valid. 
                                                          
16   The central government allocates more grants to members of their own party across the country in order to increase the 
opportunity for re-election of their fellow party members, and therefore to increase the likelihood of their retaining 
majority control (Knight 2002). 
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Following Bonhomme and Manresa (2015) in implementing instrumental variable (IV) 
techniques used in linear panel data models, a first-differenced equation is combined with 
the GFE as presented below: 
 
∆ln(𝐿𝐺𝑂𝑅)𝑖𝑡 =   θ 1∆ln(𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2∆𝑥𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝛼𝑔𝑖𝑡  +  ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡         (3) 
 
Another potential concern is the possible dependency of current taxing decisions on the 
previous level of taxation. To alleviate with potential intertemporal dependence between 
current tax decisions and the previous level of taxation, we include lagged own revenue as 
covariate.  
 
3.5 Grouped patterns and consistency of the GFE approach 
 
In order to avoid arbitrary setting of the group number that may cause a bias in parameter 
estimates, we follow Bonhomme and Manresa (2015) in using a Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) to derive the optimal number of groups.17 We then run the model to assign 
groups to departments. The misspecification of the number of groups depends on whether 
the number of groups is above or below the true one. To avoid this bias, we consistently 
estimate equation (2) for several numbers of groups to identify the optimal number of groups 
that minimise the bias from the estimation. Table 4 reports the BIC, the GFE coefficient 
estimates for total transfers and selected covariates and the standard errors. The parameter 
?̂?2 and the BIC are computed using a maximum number of groups Gmax=5. In order to 
compare with the Fixed Effect (FE) method, we report in the last row of the table the results 
of FE regression under the same specification. The results suggest that a substantial amount 
of cross-country heterogeneity is time-varying. This finding is consistent with those reported 
in Bonhomme and Manresa (2015). In fact, the objective function of FE is higher than the 
one of GFE for G=4, suggesting that a substantial amount of department heterogeneity might 
be time-varying. Moreover, the standard errors of GFE are lower than those of FE, 
confirming the consistency of GFE approach on our data. Interestingly, Table 4 shows that 
the value of the BIC decreases steadily as G increases, and reaches a minimum once G=4. 
This BIC increases for G=5. This result suggests that the optimal number of groups 
according to BIC is G=4. Thus, the following estimations in this analysis will be using G=4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are several reasons in favour of using the GFE estimator rather than FE approach to 
control for local government’s unobserved specific characteristics. First, the GFE method is 
well-suited to deal with the characteristics of our data that have a short length of time (2001-
2011), and which have a small within-department variance of total transfer. In fact, according 
                                                          
17  The following equations are used to calculate this optimal number of groups: 
BIC (G) =
1
𝑁𝑇
∑ ∑ (𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜃(𝐺)̂ − ?̂?𝑖𝑡
(𝐺))
2
+ ?̂?2
𝐺𝑇+𝑁+𝐾
𝑁𝑇
[ln(𝑁𝑇)]𝑇𝑡=1
𝑁
𝑡=1   with   ?̂?
2 =
1
𝑁𝑇−𝐺𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑇−𝑁−𝐾
∑ ∑ (𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?́?𝑖𝑡𝜃 − ?̂??̂?𝑖𝑡)
2𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑁
𝑖=1  
With  G   the number of groups, ?̂? the optimal number of groups that minimise the BIC, an upper bound of ?̂?𝑚𝑎𝑥, ?̂?
2 is a 
low bias estimates of the variance of the idiosyncratic disturbance, 𝐾 the number of parameters of estimation. 
Groups Obs BIC 
Objective 
function 
Coefficent 
estimated 
(transfer) 
Standard errors 
bootstrapped 
1 385 0.69 - - - 
2 385 0.64 52.93 0.066 0.96 
3 385 0.50 37.28 0.102 0.87 
4 385 0.24 23.27 0.259** 0.90 
5 385 0.36 15.64 0.307*** 1.03 
Fixed effects  - 22.61 0.225** 0.11 
 
Table 4 Bayesian Information Criterion and the optimal number of groups 
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to Bonhomme and Mansera (2014), the GFE estimator performs well with such small panel 
data, and produces consistent estimates as long as the number of groups is correctly 
specified. The second reason comes from the conflict that the country experienced, which 
was characterised by several rounds of events with different intensity and location around the 
departments, as shown by Dabalen et al. (2012). This effect, combined with the capacity of 
each department to recover from an economic downturn, tends to cluster departments in 
time and space in terms of revenue performance.18 To sum up, the shocks from the conflict 
affect each individual unit differently. The GFE model allows for time-varying unobservables 
in a period that is characterised by a large number of phases, as in our case. As argued by 
Bartolucci et al. (2015), the omitted individual characteristics or shocks may induce time-
varying unobservable individual characteristics. They also highlight the importance of 
accounting for these effects by using GFE methods.  
 
Figure 8 reports the unobserved trends of revenue performance using four groups (G=4), 
and highlights trends in the variables of interest. We find the presence of time-varying 
patterns across different groups in our data. Figure 8 shows that the four groups experience 
unstable paths of performance over time. For example, the left panel reports a high 
dispersion of groups’ patterns in the high incidence periods of conflict (2002 and 2010).19 The 
left panel shows that the parameter estimated ?̂??̂?𝒊𝒕 is varying over time. Moreover, in the right 
and middle panels, the paths of transfer and own revenue differ from one group to another, 
through groups 2 and 4 seem to follow very similar paths. We find therefore several cases of 
robust evidence of departments’ heterogeneity that need to be grouped according to their 
performance in revenue mobilisation and attracting transfers. These differences could not be 
accounted for by considering only the fixed specific effects.20  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 8 Group-specific time effects 
 
 
  
                                                          
18  See the maps in Appendix D for the distribution of the conflict around the country. 
19  As the departments are affected differently by conflict and characterised by disparities in revenue potential, the trend of 
their revenue performance could follow different paths according to their specific unobserved characteristics. 
20  For example, Knight (2002) demonstrates that some aspects of US state’s preferences are unobservable and that a 
fixed effect may not correct this endogeneity problem if these unobservable characteristics within a state vary over time. 
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4  Main results 
 
This section presents the empirical results from estimating several specifications of model (3) 
above, using thirty-five departments over eleven years. 
 
The results of the basic regression are presented in table 5 relative to the total local revenue 
(LNTR and NTR). We first compare Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation, GFE and the 
specifications controlling for endogeneity. The GFE model fits the data well (Column 2), 
explaining for about 70 per cent of the variation in local own revenue compared to OLS 
(Column 1). Considering that the model is not misspecified, the results show also that using 
GFE approach is relevant by looking at statistical significance of our interest variables. The 
parameter estimates for GFE are consistent with the signs predicted by theory and are 
significant at 5 per cent level. A 10 per cent increase in total central grants to local 
government induces approximately 6.2 per cent increase in own revenue mobilised by local 
administration (Column 2). The subsequent columns show the results of GFE combined with 
instrumental variable (IV) regressions in a two-stage least squares (GFE 2SLS) procedure. 
Once we control for endogeneity, the standard deviation of local own revenue decreases in 
magnitude and the estimates get accuracy. The overall conclusion from this comparison is 
that the GFE estimator deals well with this analysis compared with OLS regression.21  
                                                          
21  We also run the same specifications with the Fixed Effects and Random Effects methods: these results support the 
consistency of GFE regression in this analysis by producing similar results of the key variables on interest. 
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Table 6 shows the results of model (3) using as dependent variable local non-tax revenue – 
that is, revenue mobilised by local administration presented in per capita terms. In Column 2, 
ignoring the endogeneity, the preliminary findings provide evidence that per capita transfers 
taken as a whole to departments are likely to increase non-tax revenue mobilised locally. A 
10 per cent increase in total grants to local government is associated with approximately a 
1.81 per cent increase in non-tax revenue mobilised by local administration. However, the 
results of this column are difficult to interpret since the estimates coefficients may be biased 
due to the endogeneity of grants. As discussed in the previous section, there are several 
reasons for considering central grants as endogenous and that they need to be addressed. 
The GFE combined with 2SLS results are displayed in the subsequent Columns 3-7. The 
resulting parameter estimates are also in accordance with those of our baseline specification 
(Column 2), that central grants have a statistically significant effect on revenue collected by 
local government. This means that grants have no disincentive effects on local revenue 
mobilisation, and are likely to boost the local tax base as demonstrated in literature. However 
Dependent variable : 
Local Total Revenue 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
OLS GFE GFE_2SLS GFE_2SLS GFE_2SLS GFE_2SLS GFE_2SLS FE 
                 
D.Grants 0.029 0.585*** 0.552*** 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.55*** 0.57*** 0.094 
 (0.14) (0.223) (0.188) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.14) 
D.lag_Total local revenue  0.065** 0.197*** 0.198** 0.205*** 0.187*** 0.204***  
  (0.056) (0.053) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  
D.Education 1.682 3.44 2.163 2.18 2.02 2.41 1.73 1.84 
 (2.54) (3.35) (3.726) (1.96) (2.16) (1.96) (2.16) (2.54) 
D.Poverty headcount 0.0102 0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 0.007 
 (0.01) (0.015) (0.014) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.013) (0.017) 
D.Informal sector -1.206 -4.04 -3.95** -3.39** -3.72** -3.41** -3.70** -1.66 
 (2.075) (2.74) (3.891) (1.447) (1.520) (1.446) (1.518) (-1.96) 
D.Other revenue -0.104 -0.052 -0.006 0.0520 0.0610 0.0511 0.0594 -0.02 
 (0.0735) (0.064) (0.057) (0.0567) (0.0634) (0.056) (0.063) (0.069) 
D.Population density -0.0146 -0.791 -0.34 0.181 0.445 0.176 0.389 -0.02 
 (0.0165) (1.886) (1.48) (0.548) (0.700) (0.545) (0.668) (0.018) 
D.(Conflict events)    -0.237  0.946   
    (0.150)  (1.5)   
D.(Conflict events weighted)    -0.124  -0.261  
     (0.0999)  (0.57)  
D.(Conflict*grants)      -0.0386   
      (0.0236)   
D.(Conflict weighed*grants)      0.032  
       (0.075)  
Constant 0.00675 1.81 2.76 2.42 6.800 2.65 6.32 -0.03 
Observations 164 130 104 104 92 104 92 164 
R-squared 0.024 0.674 0.691 0.699 0.560 0.699 0.561 0.32 
Sargan-Hansen (P-value)   0.14 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16  
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic  87.31 74.17 88.18 68.37 88.591  
Anderson canon (P-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Group FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Year FE No YES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Department FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors clustered at the department level in parentheses / significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1% 
 
Table 5 Effect of central grants on total local revenue GFE 2SLS estimation 
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the coefficients decrease and vary between 1.20 per cent and 1.41 per cent through the 
different specification since we correct endogeneity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, the inclusion of lagged own revenue as a control, in order to alleviate potential 
concerns of inter-temporal dependence of local revenue mobilisation, is consistent with these 
results. The coefficient estimate is positive and statistically significant at 5 per cent. Our 
results relative to the effect of grants are consistent with those of Caldeira and Rota-Graziosi 
(2014), who predict a positive impact of grants on Benin’s communes’ own-source revenue. 
However, these findings contradict the results of Mogues and Benin (2012), who find that 
greater past external transfers to Ghana’s district governments do not encourage internal 
revenue generation. A possible explanation is that the effect differs depending on the specific 
country context – such as the scope of local governments’ revenue assignment, discretion in 
setting rates on their tax and fee bases, and other potential constraints affecting the ability of 
local governments to increase their own revenue. It seems that the effects of grants on local 
Dependent variable : 
Local Non-Tax 
Revenue (LNTR) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
OLS GFE GFE_2SLS GFE_2SLS GFE_2SLS GFE_2SLS GFE_2SLS 
                
D.Grants 0.0318 0.181*** 0.148** 0.140** 0.118* 0.116* 0.052 
 (0.082) (0.068) (0.059) (0.060) (0.064) (0.064) (0.073) 
D.lag_LNTR  0.0144 0.0148 0.0154 0.0150 0.0207 0.0198 
  (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
D.Education -1.160 0.204 -0.257 -0.313 -0.490 -0.33 -0.418 
 (1.452) (0.725) (0.618) (0.616) (0.688) (0.612) (0.674) 
D.Poverty headcount -0.003 -0.0006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 
 (0.010) (0.004) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.004) (0.0039) (0.0042) 
D.Informal sector -0.80 -2.02*** -2.24*** -2.25*** -2.32*** -2.219*** -2.286** 
 (1.184) (0.597) (0.456) (0.454) (0.483) (0.451) (0.473) 
D.Other revenue 0.091* 0.029 0.033* 0.033* 0.050** 0.0352* 0.0557** 
 (0.041) (0.02) (0.017) (0.017) (0.02) (0.017) (0.019) 
D.Population density 0.006 0.03*** -0.033 0.037 0.128 0.062 0.286 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.162) (0.172) (0.222) (0.172) (0.233) 
D.(Conflicts events)    -0.056  -0.6202  
    (0.046)  (0.418)  
D.(Conflicts events weighted)   -0.019  -0.41** 
     (0.031)  (0.185) 
D.(Conflict*grants)      -0.087  
      (0.0660)  
D.(Conflict weighed*grants)      -0.0598** 
       (0.0277) 
Constant -0.02 -0.38*** -0.23 -0.39 -0.54 -0.439 -0.941 
Observations 174 132 106 106 92 106 92 
R-squared 0.37 0.767 0.79 0.79 0.67 0.79 0.68 
Sargan-Hansen (P-value)  0.12 0.12 0.124 0.13 0.12 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 120.03 119.2 106.10 119.86 107.04 
Anderson canon (P-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Group FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No YES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Department FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors clustered at the department level in parentheses / significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
 
Table 6 Effect of central grants on local non-tax revenue GFE 2SLS estimation 
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revenue mobilisation depend on the characteristics of the process of fiscal decentralisation. 
The difference might also be explained by the method we use, which allows controlling for 
time-varying specific unobserved characteristics. Other potential reasons for the different 
results may be the allocation formulas used in Ghana, which do not contain a criteria 
sufficient to promote improvements in local government revenue mobilisation, as shown by 
Mogues and Benin (2012). A distributional formula based on a predetermined percentage of 
revenue allocated to local government, as presented in Section 2.3, seems to encourage 
internal revenue generation in Côte d’Ivoire. It is worth noting that our results are consistent 
with the theoretical prediction from fiscal federalism theory supported by Bahl (2000), who 
argues that transfers to local government might increase their fiscal capacity. 
 
The other explanatory variables have the expected sign on non-tax revenue mobilisation. For 
example, the level of knowledge and understanding in a department (share of households 
having a primary school degree) has a positive effect on local revenue mobilisation. It is also 
worthwhile mentioning that when correcting for endogeneity, the poverty headcount ratio has 
a negative effect on local revenue mobilisation, although the coefficient on this variable loses 
its statistical significance in most specifications (Tables 6 and 7). A plausible explanation is 
that local revenue is collected from the people. The wealthier people are, the higher the 
revenue performance, and vice versa. The share of informal sector has a negative and 
significant effect on local revenue mobilisation, especially for non-tax revenue. This is 
intuitive as local government collects LNTR from small businesses.  
 
Table 7 replicates the specifications of Table 6, but using local tax revenue instead of non-
tax revenue. The results confirm the findings in Table 6. Interestingly, though tax revenue is 
not directly mobilised by local administration, grants from central government have a positive 
and statistically significant effect on local tax revenue mobilisation. It is worth noting that the 
coefficients on the effect LTR is higher than those on LNTR. This suggests that grants from 
central government are more likely to boost local tax revenue collected by the General Tax 
Directorate than the revenue collected by local administration. One possible reason for this 
difference might be that the tax base for LTR is larger, and local administrations are often 
weak compared to the General Tax Directorate. This difference supports the idea that 
several taxes are well managed by the central government, as Bird (2000) argued. For 
example, property tax is collected better by the General Tax Directorate than by the local 
administration. 
 
As the country experienced a conflict over our period of interest, it is reasonable to think that 
this context may have negatively affected the capacity of local government to raise revenue. 
To allow for this possibility, we control for a number of conflict variables that capture, for 
example, a potential change in central government priorities, a persistent threat of civil war, 
and deterioration of public infrastructure. In addition, there was considerable displacement of 
population across regions and departments that could potentially affect the ability of local 
government to collect taxes. We consider separately the effect of two conflict indices 
(Columns 4 and 5 of Tables 6 and 7), and their indirect effect on revenue mobilisation 
(Columns 6 and 7 of Tables 6 and 7). The results reported for both LNTR and LTR suggest 
that conflict has no significant impact on revenue performance. The estimated coefficients of 
the interaction term with total grants are not statistically significant in any specification, 
suggesting that local government revenue performance was not affected by the combined 
effect of conflict and central grants. This unexpected result could be explained by the fact 
that the conflict was characterised by several short rounds of events with different intensity, 
and located in different departments (Dabalen and Paul 2012). With the exception of Abidjan, 
regions with a higher incidence of violence were concentrated in the northern and western 
parts of the country. The overall effect was limited in the country. It is also important to note 
that the conflict measures used in our analysis are not exhaustive. We believe that further 
analysis based on household surveys could provide more accurate results. 
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Robustness checks 
 
In order to explore the consistency of our results against a potential weak identification of 
instruments used or misspecification, we report in Appendix Tables B1 and B2 a number of 
robustness checks. First, we divide the sample into two parts, according to the signing of the 
2007 peace agreement.22 The event was important and officially marked the end of the 
conflict. All parties engaged in the conflict were supposed to participate in government. By 
running GFE 2SLS estimation for total local revenue, we find that our conclusions hold, the 
main coefficients of interest of grants are positive and statistically different from zero at 5 per 
                                                          
22  The 2007 peace agreement was signed by all political parties in the country, and marked the end of tension. Both sides 
agreed to a free and fair general election to be held in 2008. We believe that this event might have induced a change in 
the behaviour of local government. 
      Table 7 Effect of central grants on local tax revenue GFE 2SLS estimation 
Dependent variable : 
Local Tax Revenue 
(LTR) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
OLS GFE GFE_2SLS GFE_2SLS GFE_2SLS GFE_2SLS GFE_2SLS 
                 
D.Grants  -0.002 0.391* 0.41* 0.375* 0.421* 0.456* 0.396* 
  (0.14) (0.23) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.245) (0.292) 
D.lag_LTR   0.150 0.18** 0.18** 0.14 0.168** 0.144 
   (0.11) (0.086) (0.08) (0.09) (0.087) (0.093) 
D.Education  2.785 1.34 1.27 1.13 1.28 1.25 1.158 
  (2.44) (2.70) (1.964) (1.95) (2.03) (1.956) (2.166) 
D.Poverty 
headcount 
 0.013 -0.006 -0.00 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.015) (0.01) (0.015) (0.012) 
D.Informal sector  -0.314 -1.538 -1.37 -1.429 -1.310 -1.408 -1.36 
  (1.991) (1.890) (1.40) (1.396) (1.465) (1.392) (1.505) 
D.Other revenue  -0.17** -0.054 0.0003 0.0015 0.014 0.002 0.0159 
  (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.053) (0.06) (0.053) (0.060) 
D.Population 
density 
 -0.02 0.119 -0.392 -0.19 -0.26 -0.266 -0.178 
  (0.01) (0.56) (0.48) (0.52) (0.60) (0.51) (0.781) 
D.(Conflict events)   -0.136  1.004  
     (0.138)  (1.256)  
D.(Conflict events weighted)    -0.0170  -0.104 
      (0.0729)  (0.486) 
D.(Conflict*grants)       -0.02  
       (0.02)  
D.(Conflict weighed*grants)     -0.0119 
        (0.065) 
Constant  0.046 -0.373 0.841 0.393 0.396 -0.109 0.193 
Observations  164 113 91 91 81 91 81 
R-squared  0.05 0.54 0.59 0.59 0.54 0.59 0.54 
Sargan-Hansen (P-value) 0.37 0.39 0.49 0.40 0.49 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 49.79 49.36 52.50 69.58 53.29 
Anderson canon (P-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Group FE  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Department FE  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Robust standard errors clustered at the department level in parentheses / significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;  
*** significant at 1% 
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cent significance level, although the magnitude of the effect varies slightly compared to 
previous specifications. In order to assess the sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of 
additional variables, we include successively the control variables and add the illiteracy rate 
accounting for the level of knowledge. We compare also several estimations using four-year 
averages both for LNTR and LTR (Appendix Table B2). These do not alter the previous 
findings, and the main results hold across the different estimation and grants. 
 
Are the instruments valid and relevant? 
 
We check for the validity and the relevance of the instrumental variables used for estimation. 
The Hansen p-values reported for all specifications are relatively high, and exceed the 5 per 
cent level of significance. The joint null hypothesis (exogeneity) cannot be rejected at any 
reasonable significance level. This suggests that our instruments are valid – that is, 
uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded 
from the estimated equation. We test the relevance of the excluded instruments by looking at 
the p-values for the coefficient on the excluded variables in the first-stage estimates 
(Appendix Table C3). The results show that the instruments are globally relevant. The 
Anderson Canon p-values confirm that the excluded instruments are correlated with the 
endogenous regressors (grants). We reject the null hypothesis that the equations are under-
identified. The Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic for weak identification test exceeds the Stock-
Yogo critical values at any size. This suggests that our instruments are not weakly correlated 
with the endogenous regressors.  
 
 
5  Conclusion 
 
This paper analyses the effects of transfers from central government on local revenue 
mobilisation in Côte d’Ivoire. More specifically, we explore the hypothesis that the effect of 
grants varies depending on the type of local revenue and the specificities of the recipient 
local government. The research first relies on the existing literature to highlight the relevant 
channels through which these transfers may affect the revenue mobilisation of local 
government. This study goes further by analysing the distributional formula of grants. Given 
that the country experienced a long period of political instability, we also examine whether 
this conflict context affects the capacity of local government to raise taxes, and consequently 
mitigates the link between local revenue mobilisation and central grants. 
 
The main conclusion is that central transfers increase local revenue mobilisation. But the 
magnitude of this impact differs depending on the two components of local own revenue. The 
effect of grants is more important for tax revenue than non-tax revenue. Moreover, the 
results show that, though conflict has had a negative impact on local revenue mobilisation, 
this impact remains generally limited. The main results of this paper contradict those of 
Mogues and Benin (2012), who find that greater past external transfers to Ghana’s districts 
do not encourage internal revenue-raising. A possible explanation for the difference is that 
the effect differs depending on the specific country context. It might also be explained by the 
method we use, which allows controlling for time-varying heterogeneity. The conclusion of 
this research supports the idea that taxes such as property tax are well managed by the 
central government, as Bird (2000) argues. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A Revenue structure and statistics 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2 Summary statistics 
Variable 
ALL Sample Northern Southern 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Population 385 98190 116880 126560 180587 85188 67276 
Poverty headcount ratio  385 0.38 0.16 0.42 0.18 0.36 0.14 
Density (persons per km2 land area) 385 56.36 41.09 27.21 13.29 69.72 42.59 
Urban (share of urban population) 352 0.45 0.23 0.46 0.16 0.44 0.26 
Household annual consumption  385 930755.9 545811 841559.2 521151.1 971637.7 552910 
Illiteracy rate  385 0.6 0.14 0.73 0.12 0.54 0.1 
Education (primary school degree-CEPE) 385 0.3 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.31 0.08 
Share with no access to electricity 380 0.44 0.21 0.51 0.2 0.41 0.2 
Informal (share of informal sector) 380 0.61 0.1 0.62 0.09 0.61 0.1 
Share of households with no access to water 365 0.57 0.2 0.59 0.18 0.56 0.21 
Population health 380 0.16 0.09 0.16 0.09 0.16 0.1 
Conflict events (number of conflict events) 385 5.99 9.36 4.74 5.14 6.57 10.71 
Conflict events (weighted with fatality index) 378 899.49 4264.63 63.6 312.93 1260.44 5059.12 
Share with access to credit 365 0.45 0.4 0.5 0.41 0.42 0.39 
Local Non-Tax Revenue (LNTR) per capita 385 666.33 767.19 109.45 344.99 921.57 772.65 
Local Tax-Revenue (LTR) per capita 385 662.26 1068.76 100.91 287.06 919.54 1191.11 
Total Own Revenue per capita 385 2213.49 3636.71 811.01 1199.53 4163.44 31933.32 
Central grants per capita 385 1551.24 3491.70 710.10 1067.34 1936.76 4099.59 
Miscellaneous revenue per capita 385 378.85 1564.62 135.95 390.41 490.18 1861.51 
Total Expenditure  385 3062994 19000000 79808.01 89162.37 4430288 22900000 
 
  
Government 
level  
 
PATENT 
Synthetic 
tax 
Game 
tax 
Vignette 
Stamp 
duties 
Property  
Tax 
Sub-
Total2 
Total 
Purchasers Traders 
Public 
Transport 
Sub-
Total1 
Patent 
Central 
Government 
75.99 8912.47 769.92 9758.39 2715.50 0 1756.24 4290.5 11727.89 20490.15 30248.54 
(32.66) (25.12) (26.08) (25.24) (52.49) (0.00) (16.49) (97.7) (26.01) (31.3) (29.05) 
District 
0.8 10182.92 546.45 10730.18 441.53 161.28 3394.18 0 10269.54 14266.55 24996.73 
(0.34) (28.70) (18.51) (27.75) (8.53) (100.00) (31.89) (0.00) (22.78) (21.80) (24.01) 
Department 
67.37 2194.01 474.48 2735.88 101.68 0 976.57 0 1536.05 2614.3 5350.18 
(28.95) (6.18) (16.07) (7.07) (1.96) (0.00) (9.17) (0.00) (3.41) (3.99) (5.14) 
Municipality 
88.46 14181.63 1160.63 15430.73 1914.19 0 2138.67 0 17387.6 21440.47 36871.21 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (20.09) (0.00) (38.57) (32.76) (35.42) 
Other 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2378.31 100.74 4164.51 6643.57 6643.57 
0 (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 22.34) (2.29) (9.24) (10.15) (6.38) 
TOTAL 232.64 35471.04 2951.50 38655.19 5172.92 161.28 10643.99 4391.24 45085.59 65455.04 104110.24 
Percentage of different revenue allocated to each level of government 
Source: Calculation by authors with Côte d’Ivoire data from Directorate General of Taxation. 
 
Table A1 Local tax revenue collected by GTD and distributed across governments, post-
conflict Côte d'Ivoire, 2012 
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Appendix B: Robustness checks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Before Peace Agreement  After Peace Agreement 
Dependent variable :  
Total Local Revenue 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GFE_VI GFE_VI GFE_VI GFE_VI GFE_VI GFE_VI GFE_VI GFE_VI 
D.Grants 2.226*** 2.215*** 2.209*** 2.209*** 0.870** 0.841** 0.834** 0.75** 
 (0.558) (0.556) (0.552) (0.552) (0.382) (0.385) (0.37) (0.38) 
D.Poverty  0.564 0.528 0.528  -0.0116 -0.014 -0.012 
  (1.22) (1.22) (1.22)  (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
D.Density   -0.067 -0.067   -2.13** -2.162** 
   (0.0762) (0.076)   (1.057) (1.053) 
D.Illiteracy    -1.30    -2.30 
    (1.73)    (2.52) 
Constant 0.118 -0.045 0.099 0.099 -0.617 -0.62 4.75* 4.81* 
Observations 51 51 51 51 111 111 111 111 
R-squared 0.532 0.535 0.542 0.542 0.429 0.431 0.451 0.455 
Sargan-Hansen (P-value)       0.14 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.89 0.89 0.94 0.95 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic 
        22.41 21.86 21.31 21.31 102.41 98.81 98.561 93.27 
Anderson canon (P-
value) 
      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Table B2 The effect of central grants on LTR and LNTR OLS, FE and GFE estimation, 
4-year average period 
Dependent 
variable 
Local Non-Tax Revenue Local Tax Revenue 
OLS FE GFE OLS FE GFE 
 4-year average 4-year average 
              
Log_Grants 0.44* 0.42* 0.37*** 0.49* 0.76** 0.49* 
 (0.22) (0.23) (0.11) (0.25) (0.30) (0.25) 
Education 4.100* 1.525 2.92*** 3.046 -2.173 2.62 
 (2.407) (1.575) (1.09) (2.60) (2.04) (2.73) 
Poverty -0.0270** 0.0175 0.0044 -0.044*** 0.026* -0.059*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.006) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
Informal sector -1.269 1.799 0.225 -3.004 0.767 -4.394 
 (2.536) (1.68) (1.28) (2.742) (2.193) (3.158) 
Other revenue 0.0065 0.0056 -0.018 0.016 -0.006 -0.0250 
 (0.073) (0.044) (0.032) (0.0793) (0.057) (0.077) 
Density of 
population 
0.013*** 0.006 0.0008 0.013*** 0.009 0.01*** 
 (0.0039) (0.0145) (0.001) (0.004) (0.018) (0.004) 
Constant 3.090 1.83 2.53* 4.98 0.98 7.79** 
Observations 83 83 83 79 79 79 
R-squared 0.212 0.926 0.887 0.244 0.892 0.443 
Group FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Department FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
 
Table B1 Robustness check: Effect of central grants on total local revenue GFE 2SLS 
regressions by period (before and after 2007 Peace Agreement signing) 
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Appendix C Consistency of GFE method 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C1 Departments, group membership and revenue autonomy 
SOUTH NORTH 
Department  
Group 
membership 
Revenue 
autonomy 
(Quantile) 
Department  
Group 
membership 
Revenue 
autonomy 
(Quantile) 
ALEPE 1 Middle BONDOUKOU 1 High 
BONGOUANOU 1 High BOUNA 1 High 
MAN 1 High DABAKALA 1 High 
SAKASSOU 1 High BOUNA 1 High 
TIEBISSOU 1 High DABAKALA 1 High 
TOULEPLEU 1 High KATIOLA 1 High 
ABENGOUROU 2 High SAKASSOU 1 High 
ABOISSO 2 High SEGUELA 1 Low 
ADIAKE 2 Middle TOUBA 2 Low 
ADZOPE 2 High BOUAKE 2 High 
AGBOVILLE 2 High KOHORGO 3 Low 
AGNIBILEKRO 2 High  ODIENNE 3 Low 
DALOA 2 High TANDA 4 Low 
MBAYAKRO 2 High    
SANPEDRO 2 Middle    
SASSANDRA 2 Middle    
TIASSALE 2 High    
DAOUKRO 2 Middle    
TOUMODI 3 Low    
BANGOLO 4 High    
GUIGLO 4 High    
LAKOTA 4 Low    
OUME 4 High    
SOUBRE 4 Middle    
 
Group 
Local revenue 
autonomy 
Percentage of 
each category 
in the groups 
Comments 
Group 1 
Low autonomy 7.14  
Although group membership does not assume a 
particular spatial distribution, the maps (Appendix 
Figures D4 and D5) show a geographical clustering 
resulting from estimation. The group estimation has also 
classified departments with a sort of correlation in local 
revenue autonomy. The results show for example that 
group 1 contains 85% of departments with high revenue, 
while group 3 is 100% composed by departments with 
low revenue autonomy.  
 
Middle autonomy 7.14 
High autonomy 85.71 
Group 2 
Low autonomy 7.14 
Middle autonomy 28.57 
High autonomy 64.29 
Group 3 
Low autonomy 100.00 
Middle autonomy 0.00 
High autonomy 0.00 
Group 4 
Low autonomy 33.33 
Middle autonomy 16.66 
High autonomy 50 
 
Table C2 Group assignment and departments’ revenue autonomy 
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Table C3  2SLS First stage results for mean specifications of Tables 6 and 7 
 
  
Dependent variable:  
Central Grants 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Local Non-Tax Revenue Local Tax Revenue 
D.Political affiliation 0.0060 0.0022* 0.015** 0.012 0.0072* 0.031* 
 (0.0332) (0.0346) (0.0415) (0.034) (0.037) (0.044) 
D.lag_Execution rate 0.0356** 0.0369* 0.035* 0.0343* 0.0365* 0.0366* 
 (0.0215) (0.0217) (0.0219) (0.0210) (0.0214) (0.0212) 
D2.lag_Grants 0.509*** 0.511*** 0.530*** 0.514*** 0.519*** 0.540*** 
 (0.0383) (0.0386) (0.0375) (0.0467) (0.0463) (0.0461) 
D.Education -1.499* -1.428* -1.256* -1.446 -1.342 -1.156 
 (0.889) (0.833) (0.728) (0.897) (0.828) (0.729) 
D.Poverty rate 0.00066 0.00074 0.0025 0.00102 0.0012 0.0033 
 (0.0032) (0.003) (0.0025) (0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0027) 
D.Informal secteur -0.223 -0.200 -0.235 -0.222 -0.194 -0.264 
 (0.459) (0.454) (0.432) (0.498) (0.498) (0.479) 
D.Other revenue -0.000338 -0.00236 -0.00214 -0.00209 -0.00495 -0.00704 
 (0.0163) (0.0159) (0.0175) (0.0168) (0.0165) (0.0187) 
D.Population Density -0.0119 -0.0134 -0.0245** -0.0143 -0.0166 -0.0269** 
 (0.0112) (0.0109) (0.0123) (0.0116) (0.0111) (0.0122) 
D.lag_LNTR 0.0237 0.0261* 0.0242    
 (0.0156) (0.0155) (0.0191)    
D.lag_LTR     0.0412* 0.0507** 0.0578* 
     (0.0214) (0.0198) (0.0291) 
D.Conflict  -0.0495    -0.0655  
  (0.0525)    (0.0494)  
D.Weighted conflict   -0.0456**   -0.0505*** 
      (0.023)     (0.018) 
Constant -0.0051 -0.0032 0.0182 0.00128 0.0042 0.0189 
Observations 106 106 92 93 93 81 
R-squared 0.832 0.835 0.854 0.812 0.818 0.836 
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Figure D2 Violence against civilians and 
confidence zone 
Figure D3 Violence against civilians 
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Figure D1 Evolution of conflict events in Côte d’Ivoire  
Figure D4 Patterns of heterogeneity Figure D5 Local revenue autonomy 
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